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Growing or Perishing? The 
Development of Labour NGOs 
Chun-Yi Lee 
It is not easy to set up non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China. 
They have to register with the government and, for a long time, the 
government subjected them to a complicated qualification system. They 
could not register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) directly. They 
had to get sponsorship from a suitable ‘business supervision unit’ within 
the government (‘!"#$%&’) and only then, once they had a 
sponsor, were they allowed to register with MoCA. Many NGOs were 
unable to find a suitable sponsor, so could not register with the 
government. This double filter definitely impeded the development of 
NGOs in China. They had to turn into underground organizations without 
any legal status, but they still functioned. 
This situation has changed, though not necessarily to a more favourable 
one for labour NGOs. On 1 January 2012, the Guangzhou municipal 
government removed a major administrative hurdle for eight types of 
NGO seeking official registration. The government extended its so-called 
‘deregulation of social organizations’ to Guangdong province on 1 July 
2012 and now labour NGOs can register directly with MoCA without 
seeking the sponsorship of a ‘business supervision bureau’. Undoubtedly, 
this facilitated government supervision of NGOs, but then most labour 
NGOs also wish to ‘come out from underground’. Nonetheless, while 
society is relieved that the government has adopted a more open attitude 
towards NGOs, there are some signs that the government is failing to meet 
the expectations of society.  
This chapter is about labour NGOs in China and the struggles they 
faced in July and August 2012. The main focus is on the crashing down of 
labour NGOs in the southern industrialized cities of Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. Theoretically, I start with the ongoing debate about whether or 
120   Social Development NGOs 
 
not there is a civil society in China. I then go on to look at the role of 
labour NGOs in Chinese society. My aim is to paint a clear picture of how 
labour NGOs interact with three parties – the Chinese government (both 
local and central), the workers and their funders. 
Introduction 
It is important to note the difference in China between NGOs and labour 
NGOs, they are different phenomena; labour NGOs are dedicated to 
improving conditions for workers in China. 
Why, one might ask, do labour NGOs still exist in the society if they 
cannot get legal status? My answer, which I derive from the founders of 
labour NGOs, is because the society needs them. However, we have to be 
cautious about society’s needs, for when labour NGOs were forced to 
move out of their offices in the summer of 2012, the workers put up little 
resistance to the local authorities’ clamp-down on their labour NGOs. 
Many of the founders of labour NGOs in China were workers who had 
experienced unjust treatment in factories. Mr Huang (interview S1) told 
me in August 2011 that he had been a labourer in a factory but then lost 
two of his fingers in an accident at work. When the owner, who did not 
want to compensate him properly, fired him, he set about studying the 
relevant regulations and then sued the factory (successfully) for proper 
compensation. After this successful experience, Mr Huang established a 
small centre to serve his fellow workers. However, he did not have enough 
funds to work unpaid for long. The government was not happy with what 
he was doing and, without a proper office, he was unable to convince 
foreign foundations to invest in his venture.  
Though Mr Huang’s centre was unfortunately closed down, according 
to Lee and Shen, there are 30 labour NGOs in the major cities in China.1 
Labour NGOs mainly focus on helping workers with legal information and 
providing them with cultural entertainment. Since most of them cannot 
register with the government under their real names, they either use other 
titles to register their organizations or else not register and remain on the 
government’s ‘black list’. ‘Workers need us’, Mr Zhang (interview S2), 
another founder of a labour organization said: ‘we visit injured workers in 
hospital, provide them with places to go after their working lives have 
ended, give them computers to get on-line, or broadcast some movies. We 
are not doing anything illegal.’ 
By February 2012, some labour NGOs were already starting to feel 
pressure from the government. Their landlords cut off the electricity and 
water supplies to their rented offices and, as a result, some labour NGOs 
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became homeless.2 The situation grew more serious in July and August 
2012, when at least seven organizations were forced to shut down. This 
triggered a group of 140 scholars from the outside world to sign an open 
letter to the Guangdong municipality to express their grave concern over 
the Guangdong government’s repression of grass-roots labour NGOs.3 The 
letter was sent in mid-August 2012, but on 30 August another grass-roots 
labour NGO in Shenzhen (called Little Grass) suffered a severe crack-
down. On Weibo, the Chinese social media, an on-line video record4 
showed a group of people circulating in front of the Little Grass office. A 
member of staff at Little Grass started to worry and called the police; 
another tried to hand out leaflets to this unfriendly group of people about 
only wanting to help workers. The police did not come, but some minutes 
later the group revealed themselves as gangsters and used violence to enter 
the Little Grass office, throw out office papers and destroy facilities. 
Finally, they locked the door of the Little Grass office leaving the staff 
members outside. The long-awaited police never arrived.  
The Little Grass experience captured on this short video might reflect 
the situations of many other labour NGOs being forced to close down. 
Who are these gangsters who crack down on labour NGOs? Where were 
the police when the NGOs needed their protection? In computer games or 
dramas, at least there are good guys and bad guys, and in the end the good 
guys usually defeat the bad guys. However, in reality, the distinction is not 
that clear. If people lose trust in their government, they become more 
difficulty to govern, which cannot help a government’s effort to create a 
harmonious society. Can labour NGOs improve workers’ conditions?  
The debate on civil society in China 
Conceptualizing civil society 
Civil society as a norm, as Kumar rightly noted,5 sounds good; it has a 
good feel to it; it has the look of a fine old wine, full of depth and 
complexity. However, fine old wines can make one lose one’s ability to 
discriminate and one’s clarity of purpose. Because the labour NGOs we are 
discussing here should, in principle, be ‘civic’ rather than commercial or 
governmental organizations, it becomes necessary to revisit the concept of 
civil society. Though many would argue that some labour NGOs align 
themselves closely with government and others see their purpose as 
competing for financial support from foreign funding bodies, I shall argue 
in the next section that bad things happened in China because of 
constraints from the Chinese government. Since in this chapter I aim to 
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explore the role of labour NGOs as a component of the relationship 
between civil society and the Chinese state, I shall start by reviewing the 
concept of civil society per se.  
Civil society touches on the major themes of Western political thought.6 
It should be in the public realm, yet private individuals constitute it; the 
crucial point is that civil society is a collective entity existing independently 
of the state. To be more precise, Kumar views civil society from three differ-
ent perspectives.7 The first traces the concept to its classical origins at the end 
of the eighteenth century, which was when civil society was synonymous 
with the state or ‘political society’. From this vantage point civil society 
represents the growth of civilization to the point when society became 
‘civilized’ – hence the strong emphasis on citizenship, law and order.  
The second perspective derives from Marx, who claims that ‘civil society 
embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite 
stage of the development of productive forces.’8 This is the stage when the 
bourgeoisie can establish an economy that is distinct from the state and 
other regulatory bodies. In other words, Marx was arguing that members 
of the middle-class would acquire the economic means to support 
themselves independently of the state and be able to form a public arena of 
their own.  
The third perspective, which Kumar borrowed from Gramsci, holds that 
civil society is indeed not found in the sphere of production or of 
economic organization, but in the state.9 Gramsci saw the separation of 
powers as a product of the struggle between civil society and political 
society in a given historical period. He argued that civil society would be 
unable to have power of its own, even in a liberal society, that all posts are 
elective; they are all organs of political hegemony.10 For Gramsci, civil 
society is the sum of the state and political society. The hegemony of a 
ruling class is expressed through the ‘organic relations’ between the two 
realms.11 How should we understand the term ‘organic relations’? Bieler 
and Morton explain that only ideas that are connected to a particular 
constellation of social forces, which are internally related to the material, 
are significant. Only those ideas ‘organize human masses, and create the 
terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position’ can 
be considered ‘organic’.12 Extending Gramsci’s ideology of civil society, a 
neo-Gramscian approach emphasizes an identifying social force created by 
the production process as the core collective actors to be investigated in 
class struggle.13 In other words, for neo-Gramscians it is crucial to look at 
the interrelationship between the social relations of production and the 
state to understand the interaction between the state and society.  
Growing or Perishing? The Development of Labour NGOs   123 
 
Gramsci perceived civil society as an arena in which the state attempts 
to persuade the exploited classes to accept the way society develops under 
capitalism as natural and legitimate.14 In other words, at suitable times or 
on certain occasions, the system or structure will use civil society to 
convince or coerce people into accepting and believing in the system that 
oppresses them. Institutions like the church, trade unions or schools can 
sometimes exercise various forms of hegemony. As Buttigieg, extending 
Gramsci’s concept, argues, for the ruling group to be ‘hegemonic’, which 
means able to control political society with the consent of the governed, it 
must allow for a space that is, or at least appears to be, free of coercion.15 
Civil society therefore is the space in which the state allows consenting 
citizens to form their thoughts under the ruling party’s general direction. 
In other words, Gramsci and his followers negate the possibility of civil 
society having a free will; for them it is the safe state-built laboratory in 
which its citizens can play around with different experiments so long as 
they remain under the state’s control.  
According to Gallagher, there is a direct link between strengthening 
China’s legal institutions and the party’s interest in holding onto power.16 
In other words, the legal system has become the tool through which the 
CCP legitimates its power, which relates to Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony. In the Chinese context, however, the rule of law is a double-
edged sword. As Gallagher explained, on the one hand it provides the 
government with a legitimate means of justifying its power, but on the 
other the law is very flexible in its implementation. How can the govern-
ment justify the legal system if the implementation of the law rests on a 
shaky foundation? Yet, apart from sporadic complaints, the society rarely 
objects to the existence of this grey area.  
Certainly, the advocates of civil society in central and eastern Europe 
have not accepted this rather passive perception of it.17 None of the three 
perspectives mentioned above – neither classical, Marxian nor Gramscian 
– addresses the invisibility of the state; on the contrary, they all focus on 
the different ways of disentangling the constant tug-of-war between the 
state and society. At heart, Solidarity was a movement for the self-defence 
and self-management of society in which the state was not challenged, but 
completely ignored.18 If we trace back to its classical origins, we can argue 
that civil society can contribute to development and change, for it is the 
arena in which individuals can unite and be emancipated from the tyranny 
of kings or authoritarian parties. The bonding of individuals, in other 
words solidarity, is the crucial element.19 However, the state is always there; 
the Polish experience failed to answer the question of what is left when 
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civil society is kicked out of the state. In other words, as Kumar remarked, 
Solidarity lacked an account of its ultimate political role.20 There are two 
parts to the relationship between the state and society, irrespective of 
whether or not the society is civil. Even if the society successfully manages 
self-governance, who will be in charge of the governing party? The civilians 
may elect another ruling party, but if we regard the governing party as the 
state, then it will never be possible to realize the Solidarity movement’s 
dream of ruling out the state.  
Civil society in China 
Because the Solidarity movement called on the strength of civil society to 
change the regime, in the eyes of the Chinese government the term civil 
society is always tainted with rebellion. Indeed, 1989 was a significant year 
both for eastern Europe and China. The 1989 movement around 
Tiananmen Square inspired a few scholars to argue that the development 
of social organizations in China would initiate a change of China’s party-
state system. Furthermore, several argued that a demand from civil society 
could urge the state to change.21 The expectation that civil society would 
initiate dramatic change has not been realized because, after 1989, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) so feared losing control that it tightened 
its grip in every sense. In October 1989, MoCA issued a document (No. 43) 
requiring all new social organizations both to register and to affiliate with a 
government body or official organization. The latter was to act as a 
supervisor or guardian within the bureaucratic system, thus allowing the 
party to reconfirm its control over those organizations.22 As I mentioned in 
the introduction to this chapter, this double filter certainly made it difficult 
for social organizations to operate legally in China and, since all of them 
were placed under the state’s tight control, it eliminated any chance of civic 
society acting independently of the state.  
The government tightened its control not only over the registration of 
social organizations but also over individuals’ thoughts, especially among 
the intelligentsia. Intellectuals could enjoy limited freedoms so long as they 
behaved with political correctness and adhered to the ‘four cardinal 
principles’ Deng Xiaoping defined as Marxism–Leninism, socialism, party 
leadership, and people’s democratic leadership.23 One can argue that after 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement, these four cardinal principles 
blindfolded Chinese intellectuals. As Beja put it:  
Scholars and professors would be allowed to raise their academic 
level, to take part in symposiums and conferences aboard, to do 
Growing or Perishing? The Development of Labour NGOs   125 
 
research in [a] foreign university. But they would do so on 
condition they did not try to revive the organizations they had 
created in the 1980s, whose goal was to push for the transformation 
of the regime, and, obviously, that they not try to link with the 
disgruntled portions of the population to help them translate their 
discontent into political demands.24 
Therefore, in discussing the development of civil society in China, it is 
difficult not to mention the support of the government from a positive 
perspective and surveillance from the government from a pessimistic one. 
Pei pointed out that the number of civic organizations increased dramati-
cally in the 1990s.25 Nonetheless, an increase in numbers is only one gauge 
of the development of civil society and perhaps a superficial one as well. I 
hold a less positive view than Pei does about the equation between 
increasing numbers of civic organizations and the growth of civil society. 
However, it is important to note from Pei’s work that there was a vibrant 
growth in interaction between social organizations and the state after the 
1990s. Chinese scholars speak with different voices about the development 
of civic organizations in China. B. G. He, citing Chan, noted that ‘Chinese 
autonomous organizations are neither completely autonomous from the 
state nor completely dependent on the state.’26 He failed to elaborate on 
what kind of power relationship existed between the state and these social 
organizations that endured a semi-independent status. Others argue that 
social organizations have to gain political support from the state.27 Hsu 
plainly stated that, in the Chinese context, civil society does not conform 
to its classical definition; it should be presented not as an opposing force 
against the state but as a negotiated space.28  
After the 1990s, civic organizations, represented as civil society in 
China, had to align tightly with the state’s support. As a result, quite a few 
scholars have adopted Schmitter’s theoretical framework to analyse the 
development of civil society in China from the perspective of state 
corporatism.29 Originating from fascist Italy’s economic framework of 
‘corporate economy’,30 Schmitter revived the concept after the Second 
World War and changed it to ‘corporatism’, which he detached from 
fascism to mean a ‘system of interest representation’. The system is non-
competitive and hierarchical in a state society because the state has to 
authorize each unit in it.31 The development of civic organizations, 
especially labour NGOs, has the appearance of corporatism. However, I 
argue that, for two reasons, labour NGOs in China only have the 
appearance but not the essence of state corporatism. 
126   Social Development NGOs 
 
Corporatists mainly see the society as an organic unit within which the 
institutional arrangements that link the organized interests of employers 
and the working class to the decision-making process of the state achieve 
class hegemony during economic development.32 It is a trade-off between 
the state and civic organizations. The state allows organizations to 
participate in policy decision making to increase its own legitimacy. In 
democratic corporatism, as Schmitter indicated, this exchange is more 
direct. In authoritarian states, the exchange between the state and civic 
organizations is more indirect and the nature of the exchange is different 
from that of democratic corporatism.33 Cox further explains that we can 
define state corporatism as the form of corporatism in production 
relations in which the state takes total control of the political leadership; in 
other words, state corporatism predominates over both management and 
labour without their being any effective counterweight through parliamen-
tary control or accountability.34 The main point here, as Cox explains, is 
that both worker and employer organizations seek satisfaction mainly 
through direct relations with officials of either the state bureaucracy or the 
ruling political party. And, as Gallagher reminds us, cultivating clientelistic 
ties to party authorities is, for Chinese workers, a crucial aspect of getting 
by and improving their position in the factory.35 Peaceful labour relations 
are important to state corporatism because they serve the national interest.  
In that they are forced, either by threats or enticements, to cooperate 
with the state, labour NGOs in China do not quite fit the model of state 
corporatism. The workers, the target groups of these NGOs, do not 
necessarily benefit from the labour NGOs’ cooperation with the state. Also, 
by its nature, corporatism places an emphasis on institutional arrange-
ments, yet the settings in which labour NGOs operate in China are not 
institutionalized. As I mentioned earlier, labour NGOs cannot even receive 
proper institutional recognition and, because they are scattered around 
various cities, there is no collective collaboration between different labour 
NGOs. Therefore, the relationship between the state and the development 
of labour NGOs in China bears only a shallow resemblance to state 
corporatism; its essence lies in a very different setting. 
According to Gallagher, building the ‘rule of law’ in China is a state-led 
project. In fact, the rule of law is intended to be a substitute for more 
radical political change and to bring with it increased channels through 
which citizens can seek redress for their grievances and protect their legal 
rights. More importantly, it is also designed to legitimate the rule of the 
CCP as an institution that can both bring rapid economic growth and 
ensure social stability through the use of the law and courts.36 As Gallagher 
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indicated, the whole state apparatus, that is the many governmental 
organizations, the National People’s Congress, bureaucratic agencies, local 
government and the State Council, all actively engage in building the ‘rule 
of law’.  
Historical review of the Chinese workers and the role of the 
All-China Federation of Unions (ACFTU) 
When the People’s Republic China (PRC) was newly born in 1949, it 
declared itself a country that would fight for workers’ rights and equity. At 
that time, Chinese workers were by and large a relatively privileged group 
within Maoist state socialism: they were a class that enjoyed stable, secure 
incomes, socially-provided housing, medical care, education, guaranteed 
lifelong employment, and social and political prestige. Nevertheless, the 
economic structure has changed dramatically since 1978 when China 
decided to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI) as its main source of 
economic development.  
Quite a lot has been written about workers’ protests at different 
moments in the PRC’s history.37 Some of these scholars believe that the 
1989 Tiananmen Square movement was especially significant to the 
Chinese labour movement because it gave rise to a totally independent 
labour union, the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Federation (gongzilan), 
being established in May 1989. Although gongzilan had a very short life, 
only until June 1989, its former members still campaign for Chinese labour 
rights from all over the world.38  
Since the emergence and crackdown of gongzilan, a question that has 
intrigued scholars interested in Chinese labour studies has to be addressed. 
This is, are there any trade unions left to represent Chinese labourers?  
The ACFTU, inaugurated in 1953, is the largest federation of trade 
unions in China, but it is a semi-official organization affiliated to the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While many studies point to its 
impotence in representing Chinese workers, others argue that the ACFTU 
is incorporated into the party/state system by design – this is, in effect, 
‘corporative trade unionism’.39 Researchers have classified the ACFTU as 
an example of state–society corporatism, which means that in the relation-
ship between the ACFTU and the state, the latter plays the overwhelmingly 
dominant role.40 If we retrace our steps back to the main definition of 
corporatism in the previous section, however, we see that corporatism, 
according to Schmitter, should be a ‘system of interest representation’.41 
More importantly, corporatists argue that corporatism is mainly about the 
trade-off between the state and civic organizations. From this vantage 
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point, the ACFTU is by no means a pure ‘civic organization’; it is a semi-
official organization. In addition, there is no ‘trade-off’ between the 
ACFTU and the state; it only serves as a one-way ‘transmission belt’. 
Theoretically, the ACFTU should act on behalf of the state to mobilize 
workers for more production on the one hand, while collecting workers’ 
voices to report back to the state on the other. However, the latter function 
is rather superficial.42 As Howell indicated, the problem for the ACFTU is 
twofold: first, it is unclear who the ACFTU should represent, the workers 
or the party; and second, it is unclear how the ACFTU is supposed to 
represent a workforce as differentiated and diffuse as the one in China.43 Not 
only did the semi-official structure of the ACFTU weaken its voice before 
the state, but also the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 further undermined 
its potential to act as an independent trade union. Chan claimed that the 
effect of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre was that the state tightened its 
control on any organized union, including the ACFTU, thus undercutting 
the union’s traditional base in state enterprises.44 She argued that the national 
political leadership increasingly accepted privatization in the form of the 
reform of SOEs in the mid-1990s, labour flexibility, integration into the 
global market and the pursuit of economic development at the cost of 
equality. Under strong pressure from the government, the ACFTU gradually 
accepted this reality, while lower-level trade-union cadres had no concept of 
activist trade unionism. ACFTU officials had begun to understand their role 
as securing their own survival rather than protecting the interests of workers. 
Since the ACFTU cannot represent the interests of all Chinese labourers 
and the wholly independent labour organization (gongzilan) was destroyed 
during the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, some scholars have started to 
ask why Chinese labourers failed to organize a collective movement to 
improve their status. China scholars have recently come up with various 
explanations for the observed patterns of sporadic contention, which 
include grievances, mobilizing structures, claims, tactics and targets of 
protest.45  
Different types of labour NGOs in China 
In this section, I look at labour NGOs from four angles – legal status, 
founders, funding and the activities they provide.  
Legal status 
Because of the impediments to registering social organizations with the 
government introduced in 1989, if they are to survive labour NGOs in 
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China have had no option but to develop some basic counter strategies, of 
which there are three.46 The first is to collaborate with organizations with a 
clear legal status, for instance local trade unions, the Communist Youth 
League and academic institutions. By doing so, labour NGOs can carry out 
their projects in the name of their affiliates, yet retain autonomy over the 
actual work. This strategy bears some similarity to the government’s 
double-filter mechanism for registering social organizations. The differ-
ence here is that the affiliation is with an academic institution rather than a 
government bureau. The second strategy, which is commonly seen in 
practice, is that the NGO registers itself as self-employed, an independent 
enterprise, or a limited company. Mr Jiang registered his organization as a 
commercial company. He told me:  
I am using my company’s resource to support my organization. 
What I really want to do is to provide workers with a platform to 
meet up with each other and even do some charity work for other 
minority groups during the weekend. Therefore, during the week 
days I focus on my ‘company’ but I will organize activities for 
workers during the weekend.47  
Mr Jiang has two business cards, one for his commercial business and one 
for the workers. The third strategy is to choose not to register at all, which 
means going underground and keeping a low profile. However, the 
government is most likely to target this type of NGO and it is difficult for 
them to survive under government’s surveillance. 
Founders 
Lee and Shen divided the founders of labour NGOs into two main 
categories – formal workers and concerned professionals.48 They then 
further divided the group of concerned professionals into journalists, 
academics and lawyers.49 From their thorough description of the three 
groups, it appears that the grand social structure somehow constrained the 
efforts of the concerned professional groups to help the workers, which 
takes us back to a previous argument about the Chinese intelligentsia. As 
Cheng50 pointed out, there are different groups of Chinese intellectuals, of 
which some support labour NGOs, whereas there are others who compete 
among themselves for whatever power, interests and resources they can 
wrest from the state. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that a scholar from a 
well-known university in Guangzhou remarked that ‘we do not do 
research on civil society, but we focus on good governance.’51 While one 
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person’s remark cannot represent the whole picture, it is more or less an 
indication of the government’s tight control over the academic sector. 
Other professionals who wish to help workers face a similar scenario. The 
leader of the Institute for Contemporary Observation (ICO) in Shenzhen, 
Liu Kaming, is a journalist on the Legal Daily, has a doctoral degree in 
Chinese literature52 and has a very good relationship with the Shenzhen 
government. A famous labour-law firm, Laowei, charges low fees for 
labour lawsuits, promotes collective bargaining and provides training 
courses for labour organizations in the Shenzhen and Guangzhou areas. 
One lawyer from this company said: ‘we are doing reform within the 
system; we do not want the system to collapse.’53  
Chen and Dickson argue that private entrepreneurs are the allies of the 
state, which is why one never sees private entrepreneurs in China joining 
the ranks of the middle class to fight for their interests against the state. 
The party state offers private businesses all sorts of opportunities to embed 
in the state, an embeddedness that provides privileged access not only to 
political decision making but also to more economic opportunities.54 I 
argue that the mechanism of political embeddedness works as well for 
merchants and academics as it does for the state’s closest ally, the private 
capitalist. From this point of view, the position of civil society in China is 
perhaps closest to Gramsci’s notion that the ‘“state” is equal to political 
society plus civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the 
armour of coercion’.55 Here it is necessary to emphasize that the Chinese 
government both uses force to coerce and/or punish society and provides 
incentives to allow social sectors to submit willingly. To return to 
academia, the reason why most social scientists decide against writing 
about civil society is because it is not easy to get government funding for 
this kind of research and, consequently, such research papers are unlikely 
to be published in the top-ranking Chinese journals. The state does not 
‘punish’ intellectuals as it did in 1989, but rather it coerces them away 
from undertaking research on sensitive topics.  
My findings revealed that most leaders of labour NGOs in Shenzhen are 
former workers who had suffered unjust treatment at work, an unlawful 
dismissal or work injury for which they had been refused compensation, 
who decided to transform their personal experiences into organizing an 
institute to help their fellow workers. Their motive is simple. They feel 
solidarity with their fellow workers and do not want them to suffer the 
same injustice as they did. However, they need concrete resources to turn 
their good intentions into a reality. In fact, they need money and capable 
helpers, but most of them will not accept funds from government or 
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enterprises because they are on ‘the opposite side’. Some use their own 
savings to start the organization,56 most probably a one-person office to 
begin with, but this source is unsustainable. In the absence of other 
choices, they tend to turn to foreign funding bodies. Nevertheless, as I 
pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, Mr Huang found that, 
without a proper office or competent staff, foreign foundations are 
unwilling to donate money and a viscious circle sets in, which only goes to 
prove that it is difficult for an individual worker to organize a centre. Apart 
from financial resources, such a centre also needs management skills, legal 
expertise and the ability to negotiate with employers. To compensate for 
this shortfall, most worker-established organizations choose to work with 
an academic institution. For example, Yan-Yet Sen University in 
Guangzhou has set up a labour study centre as a platform for academics 
and practitioners. Laowei, the labour-law firm, works with a couple of 
labour NGOs in Guangzhou and Shenzhen to help handle their legal 
problems. The leader of a labour NGO in Shenzhen told me that ‘it is 
difficult for workers to talk with those lawyers if they have need of a 
lawsuit. There is a gap between workers and lawyers. Therefore, our role is 
to be the middleman to help workers communicate with lawyers.’57 
However, this external help does not negate the need for properly-funded 
and capably-staffed labour NGOs.  
Funding 
If we examine Chinese NGOs from a strictly Western notion of what such 
an organization is, namely it has no association with government and does 
not aim to make profits, most probably very few labour NGOs in China 
would qualify as true NGOs. It might sound like a cliché, but NGOs in 
China have a Chinese character58 in that they derive their funding from 
government, from government-organized non-governmental organiz-
ations (GONGOs) and from foreign foundations.  
GONGOs have complicated identities. Some argue that, despite their 
government funding, they can still serve society so long as they do not 
contravene any governmental rules.59 However, other scholars argue that, 
while government protection ensures their legitimacy and financial status, 
they will either intentionally or inadvertently sacrifice worker solidarity for 
the collective capacity of self-protection.60 The struggle over whether or not 
to accept government funds has probably existed for a long time. Nonethe-
less, since the crackdown on Shenzhen labour NGOs between June and 
October 2012, the harsh political atmosphere has exacerbated those NGOs’ 
struggles. In June 2012, the leader of an NGO in Guangzhou told me that:  
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It is a difficult choice for us to consider whether to accept govern-
ment help. For us, the important thing is to survive first. Some 
organizations stubbornly refuse to take government help, so they 
have to move out of their offices or have their electricity or water 
cut off. I cannot say we will take government help; the only thing I 
can say is that we weigh up our survival very carefully.61 … The 
government’s version is: if those organizations do not promote 
illegal activities, and it is so difficult to maintain an organization, 
why do they not accept government’s purchasing funds?62  
Again we see echoes of Gramsci’s idea that the state is equal to society. The 
Chinese state is ominous; if the government cannot reach every corner, it 
will purchase the service from one of these NGOs.63 
If not funded by the government, most labour NGOs get their funding 
from a foreign foundation. As Lee and Shen indicated, because funds are 
scarce and unstable, labour NGOs often operate as a commercial market or 
industry, supported by the European Union, foreign governmental bodies, 
the ILO, the United Nations or even branding companies.64 One might 
assume that ‘independent’ labour NGOs funded by foreign foundations 
would have more courage than GONGOs to step over boundaries and 
initiate activities that raise the consciousness of workers. However, this 
assumption is not always well founded, for many foreign foundations 
deliberately avoid sponsoring projects they might consider politically 
incorrect or violating governmental policies.65 More importantly, NGOs 
that receive foreign funding are government targets.66 As I mentioned 
earlier, it is easy for a government to close down NGOs, but difficult for 
labour NGOs to obtain legal status; consequently, some of them do not 
register with the government and others register as commercial companies. 
The government can easily ban an NGO if its activities are inconsistent 
with its registered function. The fourth angle from which to view labour 
NGOs is the activities they provide for workers.  
Activities 
According to Chan, labour NGOs in China adopt either a community 
intervention approach or an enterprise intervention approach.67 The 
former offers the workers legal seminars on labour laws, legal infor-
mation, computers with free internet access and movies at the weekends. 
In other words, they offer social activities with a view to promoting 
worker awareness of their legal rights, occupational health and safety and 
gender equality, in short, workers’ right in general. Different scholars hold 
Growing or Perishing? The Development of Labour NGOs   133 
 
widely differing views about the effectiveness of these seminars. Lee and 
Shen68 are highly critical of the labour-law training workshops that labour 
NGOs provide. They claim that the workers only attend them because the 
NGOs pay them 20 RMB to do so, and 20 RMB is more than their hourly 
wage. They also point out that the workers’ feedback from these 
workshops is quite useless. Their observations raise some questions. Why 
is the law not implemented? Do the existing laws protect workers’ 
interests and rights?69 
Other scholars find the legal workshops extremely helpful and 
Froissart70 positively lauded the labour NGOs’ legal seminars on worker 
entitlement to overtime pay. The legal workshops will probably never 
answer the questions that Lee and Shen raised, mainly because those 
NGOs, and even their foreign funders, cannot really transgress sensitive 
boundaries. However, can we argue that the only reason to organize these 
seminars is to meet the funding body’s requirement? My personal 
experience of a workers’ centre in Shenzhen is that an understanding of 
worker rights gradually emerges from those ‘not so relevant’ seminars. As 
one of the organizers, a graduate from a leading Chinese university, told 
me: ‘we have to know what the workers want. They have worked the whole 
week and, at the weekend, what we can provide to attract them to come 
over are those topics that really interest them.’71 These are not always about 
defending their rights; most of the time they are about making their leisure 
hours more interesting and meaningful. However, raising worker 
awareness is at the heart of all the seminars this centre provides. At some 
seminars, they discuss the role of trade unions, or speak about the workers’ 
movements of other countries. After one of these seminars, a worker told 
me:  
If it were not for these regular seminars organized by this centre, we 
would not think about trade unions, or we would not dare to 
discuss trade unions with other people. This centre is like a 
platform for us to meet and discuss issues with different people 
whom we do not easily meet in the factories.72 
Those understandings and realizations certainly take a long time to mature 
in the workers’ minds, but patience and tenacity are perhaps the best 
words to describe the spirit that drives these labour NGOs to run seminars 
for the workers.  
The members of these community-based labour NGOs also visit injured 
workers in hospital and distribute leaflets outside factories about labour 
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law regulations and social security. As Chan mentioned, the outreaches of 
these events for workers are effective,73 though outdoor activities attract 
more government attention than indoor ones. Under some circumstances, 
local governments might try to take advantage of the NGO’s work, at 
which point they adopt a neutral, defensible stance.74 For instance, they can 
rarely spare the manpower to visit injured workers. At a time when the 
political atmosphere was especially tense just before the eighteenth 
congress in November 2012, local officials put pressure on labour NGOs to 
avoid any possible disturbance of the status quo. Although Chan argued 
that moving to a different industrial zones was beneficial to NGO 
development, the NGOs decided to adopt a ‘guerrilla strategy’.75 It is in fact 
very difficult for them to maintain worker solidarity if they have to move 
their offices to different localities from time to time. It takes time for 
workers to trust an institution; also, workers are ambivalent about legality 
and, to be on the safe side, usually shy away from attending the activities of 
what they might perceive as an illegal organization. Therefore, maintaining 
labour NGOs can be even more difficult than fighting a guerrilla war.  
With his enterprise intervention approach, Chan provided another 
model of an NGO operation.76 Various branding companies put external 
pressure on the NGOs that Chan listed in his analysis, which are mostly 
based in Hong Kong or even abroad, to conduct in-factory audits and 
training. The only China-based organization to conduct in-factory audits 
or training was the Institute of Contemporary Observation (ICO), though 
to what extent the ICO can be called a labour NGO is difficult to say. It 
received funding from abroad and requests from branding companies to 
conduct in-factory audits, but it is closer to a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) company than to a labour NGO. I believe that 
although audits and in-factory training are important for keeping up the 
pressure on factories to maintain a decent working environment, it is the 
other side of the coin from the workers’ perspective. These labour NGOs 
might be important for consumers, but they have no direct contact with 
the workers.  
Civil society with restraints 
Can labour NGOs in China serve as a civil society? This question cannot be 
easily answered, even after having reviewed different types of labour 
organizations in China. In this section, I point out the difficulties that 
labour organizations face in China in the hope that it will improve our 
understanding of why there are so many restraints on labour NGOs 
interacting in civil society. 
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Lack of solidarity among labour NGOs 
Getting financial support and avoiding government pressure are the two 
essential constituents of NGO survival in China. With limited resources 
from foreign sponsors, fighting for financial support has become a major 
concern for most labour NGOs and, with such intense competition, it is 
difficult to build solidarity among them.77 Labour NGOs also suspect one 
another of having been ‘bought off’ by the government, so are reluctant to 
share information. In February 2012, shortly before the recent crack-down 
started in the summer of 2012, a radical labour NGO, Dagongze, was 
expelled from its office. It started to visit other NGOs, not only in the Pearl 
River Delta but also in northern China and Beijing, in search of support. 
Its efforts were in vain and, one after the other, the local government in 
Shenzhen used violence to close down at least three more NGOs. More-
over, there is almost no contact between one NGO and another.  
When I was conducting fieldwork in Shenzhen in May–June 2012, an 
NGO staff member called me up for information about another NGO I 
had just interviewed. That the staff member did not intend to visit or talk 
to the other NGO, but instead sought the information from a third party 
was an indication of the mistrust between NGOs. In early January 2013, 
the ICO invited ten grassroots NGOs in Shenzhen and Guangzhou to meet 
at its office to discuss the possibility of cooperation among them. During 
that meeting, all the NGO leaders spoke of how difficult they found it to 
get funding and to keep good staff. The ICO called the meeting because the 
Canadian consulate had a budget to fund Chinese labour organizations. 
The ICO was to serve as a bridge in the discussions about the fund and the 
Canadian representative attended the meeting. It is at least a positive sign 
that these labour organizations were able to discuss the funding appli-
cation, but even so, the general feeling among them was that there is 
virtually no solidarity between them. The entrepreneurs, for instance, are 
much more united than the labour organizations because they have 
common interests to fight for that bind them together. Labour organiz-
ations have idealistic goals in common, such as worker solidarity, rights 
protection and the integration of migrant workers,79 but in reality they 
have conflicting interests. This fatal weakness allows the state to control 
them with ease. 
Lack of worker support 
After the summer of 2012, I went back to Shenzhen to observe the 
aftermath of the crack-down. It was not the first time the government had 
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suppressed labour NGOs. I wanted to witness the workers’ response. 
Labour NGOs are designed to service the workers, so when the 
government closes down the institution, why is there no mass strike to 
express their discontent? Two interviewees provided their insights. One is a 
radical labour lawyer working at Laowei:80  
All those foreign-funded labour NGOs were only organizing some 
social activities; they did not really respond to the central need of 
workers – workers’ rights. Therefore, when the government crushed 
them, the workers did not care much because they thought they had 
only lost a place for socialization. In other words, in the future, only 
the type of NGO that promotes workers’ movements will survive 
because workers will fight back if the government dared to crush 
them. This is because workers would feel that their interests and 
futures were tightly connected to the NGOs that promoted their 
rights, not to those that just organize social events.  
When I asked another interviewee, who was on the staff of an NGO the 
government closed down at the end of September 2012, why the outside 
world had not seen the workers plead for their organization, she told me 
that:  
When we were forced to leave our office, there was a small group of 
workers standing outside our office to support us. However, we told 
them to leave because we did not want to get them involved, or 
even cause them to be sent to prison. We just wanted to protect 
them.’81  
Whether it is because workers do not relate to NGOs very much or 
because NGOs want to protect them from governmental pressures, we do 
not hear workers’ voices at the scene. From the workers’ reactions to the 
crack-down of their labour NGOs, it is clear that the link between their 
strikes and labour NGOs is not strong. In other words, the role of labour 
NGOs in promoting a civic space for labour is very weak. Although 
workers organize strikes, they do not really seem to care about the position 
of NGOs, which suggests that the input of labour NGOs might be limited. 
Certainly, this is probably an overly superficial verdict, but I believe that 
only when labour NGOs can really motivate workers to the extent that they 
work for them as long-term volunteers, can we start to discuss whether 
labour NGOs can initiate a limited civil society in China.  
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Conclusion 
To return to the question of whether labour NGOs in China are growing 
or shrinking, I believe that it will depend on whether labour NGOs can 
represent workers and whether or not workers can see labour NGOs as 
serving their interests.  
  
Notes from the field 
Note 1: What do you think of labour NGOs in China? 
I think now that the most important thing for Chinese workers in 
terms of industrial action is the legitimacy of strikes. The new 
labour contract law (promulgated in January 2008) does not 
clarify whether it is legal to strike. For most workers, it is 
important to know whether it is legal or illegal to participate in 
strikes. Equally, it is also important for workers to know whether 
labour NGOs are operating legally. At the end of the day, workers 
do not want to do ‘illegal things’ that will make them lose their 
jobs. However, the problem now in China, from a lawyer’s 
perspective, is the grey zone of the legal system. If a substantial 
number of workers go on strike, then nobody will question the 
legitimacy of the strike. For instance, did anybody question the 
legitimacy of the famous Honda strike in 2010? No, because the 
number of workers on strike was enormous – almost 2000. Those 
employees were organized and determined, so their strike to 
demand a wage increase was successful. If we look at strikes in 
small factories, we see that managers or local officials often 
‘threaten’ the workers by telling them that their strikes are ‘illegal’. 
As a matter of fact, industrial action (or striking if you prefer) 
does not violate any Chinese law, but then Chinese law also does 
not permit or accept it. The labour contract law simply does not 
address this important issue. Can we therefore say that because it 
does not address the issue, organizing a strike is against the law? 
Coming back to my original point, I think that the legitimacy of 
industrial action, or of labour organizations in China, does not 
depend on the government’s judgement because the government’s 
verdict depends on the workers’ willingness. In other words, it 
might sound illogical, but from my observation, if workers are  
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determined enough and the number of people going on strike is 
large enough, the government will step back and try to negotiate 
with the workers. My conclusion is that, living in a society ruled 
by people and not the law, you have to be strong enough to stand 
your ground; you cannot depend on or trust a legal system with so 
many loopholes and grey areas.  
Duan Y, labour lawyer at Laowei law firm 
 
  
Notes from the field 
Note 2: What do you think of labour NGOs in China? 
I organized a small labour NGO from 2006 to 2010. Before that I 
was a normal worker at a factory. I started to establish a labour 
NGO because I was injured at work. My job was to operate a big 
chopping machine; one day when I was working, I did not pay 
much attention and the machine chopped off two fingers on my 
left hand. I wanted the factory to pay my medical expenses, but 
the managers at the beginning were very reluctant; they did not 
want to be responsible for my injury. I was also confused, I 
thought they ought to pay me because I was injured at work, but I 
did not know how to ask them to do so. I decided to study the 
law by myself and I figured out the legal channel to negotiate with 
them. I did not take the case to court, yet I had a successful 
negotiation with the manager. After two years, I got full 
compensation for my medical expenses. After my own experi-
ence, I saw many of my co-workers face similar difficulties; we are 
the weak party in facing employers, and most of us do not know 
how to bargain with the employers when we have problems at 
work. It was for this simple reason that I decided to establish a 
worker’s centre by myself to help my co-worker. However, I 
realized that personal willingness was not enough to establish a 
labour NGO. One needs funding to run a centre. At the 
beginning, I could receive some support from international 
foundations, but the situation deteriorated and it became more 
difficult for my small centre to get funding. The international 
organizations want to see a big clean office in which everything is  
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organized, but I am only one person; it was difficult for me to get 
things done in an organized way with limited funding. It is like 
the chicken and egg problem. I needed more money to run an 
organized centre but because I did not have enough money to 
organize things in the centre, I lost the credit to get more funds 
from those international funding organizations. Quite apart from 
anything else, local officials always suspected I had some ‘illegal 
dealings’ with foreign foundations to mobilize workers. 
Meanwhile, I got married and we had a baby boy in 2009. My 
wife told me that, even if not for her but for our kid, I had to give 
up my job as a freelancer helping workers. I had to find a ‘proper’ 
job to raise our family. That was a very strong statement and I 
thought I had to listen to her. Therefore I closed down my small 
worker centre and started to find jobs at factories. However, 
because my reputation of helping workers ‘deal with’ their 
employers had spread around the neighbourhood, it was not easy 
for me to find a job at a factory; they saw me as a trouble maker. 
This is why, even now, I have not been able to get a stable job, I 
get some part-time jobs from time to time. Nevertheless, in my 
mind, I still wish, one day that I will be able to run a centre to 
help workers, I think this is my life-time dedication.  
Huang Ming Ming, former organizer of a labour NGO,  
now in precarious jobs 
 
  
Notes from the field 
Note 3: What do you think of labour NGOs in China? 
I do not think that those labour NGOs actually need to face such a 
difficult struggle. The government knows that workers have a lot 
of problems at work; we also want to help workers, as do those 
grassroots labour NGOs. Since our aims are the same, why do we 
not work together? Therefore, in Guangzhou, we persuaded 
labour NGOs to work with the government; we provided funding 
to those labour NGOs and we relied on their experiences to work 
with workers. I think their role is important and no governmental 
bureaux can replace them. We need these intermediate organizations 
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between government and society. We (the government) certainly 
do not want to see those organizations work with international 
funding bodies; it is a very sensitive issue in the eyes of 
government that those organizations should receive international 
funds. Our logic is that if they need money to help workers, they 
can apply for government funding; we are very willing to help; 
they do not need to ask for money from aboard. We do not want 
to put those labour organizations in a difficult position; therefore 
we showed our utmost sincerity to work with them. As a matter of 
fact, many labour organizations in Guangzhou have already 
established a collaborative relationship with us; they have all made 
good progress so far. We hope to be more open to the society and 
learn from grassroots NGOs. There are a lot of misunderstandings 
about the government’s attitude. I do hope in the long run that 
those labour NGOs, and more importantly workers, will be able to 
understand the government’s position. The government does not 
want to have conflicts in the society; we hope by working with 
those labour NGOs to create a smooth industrial relationship. 
Chen Wei-Guan, former chairman of Guangzhou city ACFTU 
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